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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
SECURITIES REGULATION: SECTION 16(b)
SHORT-SWING PROFIT LIABILITY
APPLICABLE TO STOCK PURCHASED
DURING DIRECTORSHIP BUT SOLD AFTER
RESIGNATION
In Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp.' the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit found Martin Marietta Corporation liable under
Section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 19342 for short-
swing profits realized on the sale of stock of Sperry Rand
Corporation, purchased while Martin Marietta's president was on
the Sperry board of directors and sold after he resigned that
directorship. Martin Marietta had purchased 700,000 shares of
Sperry Rand during the period from December 14, 1962, through
April 29, 1963, on which date Martin Marietta's president, George
Bunker, was named to Sperry Rand's board of directors. Until
Bunker's resignation on August 1, 1963, Martin Marietta
accumulated an additional 101,300 shares. Thereafter Martin
Marietta sold all of its Sperry Rand stock between August 29,
1963 and September 6, 1963. The plaintiff shareholder subsequently
commenced a derivative action on behalf of Sperry Rand alleging
that Bunker was deputized by, or represented, Martin Marietta
during his Sperry Rand directorship and that Martin Marietta's
resulting "director" status obligated it to return to Sperry Rand
the short-swing profit realized on the sale of the 101,300 shares
which had been purchased during the Bunker/Martin Marietta
directorship. The district court found that Martin Marietta had not
deputized Bunker to represent its interests on Sperry Rand's board
of directors,3 but the Second Circuit reversed, finding the district
court conclusion "clearly erroneous" with regard to the facts and
inferences concerning Bunker's deputization. Moreover, the court
'406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969).
- 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp.. 286 F. Supp. 937, 948 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
'406 1.2d at 263.
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held that even though the sale was made after Bunker's resignation,
Martin Marietta was liable for profits made on stock purchased
while he was a director and sold within six months of purchase.5
Section 16 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 was
enacted to curtail the widespread practice of insiders using
information obtained by virtue of their relationship to a
corporation to profit in short-swing trading in the corporation's
stock.7 The major impact of section 16 is contained in subsection
(b) which provides that "such beneficial owner, director, or
officer" shall be liable to the issuer for any profit he realizes on a
purchase or sale, or sale and purchase of the equity securities of the
issuer within a period less than six months8 It is usually stated that
the words "such beneficial owner, director, or officer" refer to the
description in subsection (a), which states the reporting
requirements of section 16.P Section 16(a) requires "[e]very person
who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10
per centum of any class of any equity security . . . or who is a
director or an officer of the issuer of such security . . ." to file an
initial statement of the amount of his ownership of stock in the
issuer and to file subsequent reports after every month in which
there is a change in his ownership." Because the statute is aimed at
possible rather than proven misuse of inside information" and
because section 16(b) exposes the insider to mere remedial civil
liability in favor of the issuer,'2 liability for short-swing profit is
imposed expressly irrespective of intent to profit. 3 In reconciling
the literal meaning of the statute with its broad prophylactic
Id. at 269.
15 U.S.C. § 78p (1964).
'See I.R. Riip. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934): 2 L. Loss. SECURITIES
REGULATION 1037-38 (2d ed. 1961); Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities
Exchange Act. 66 HARv. L. REV. 385, 612 (1953).
9 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964). See generall. 2 L. Loss. SECURITIES REGULATiO, 1058-1121
(2d ed. 1961).
'See H. BLOON'I.'TAL. SECURITIES LAW 366 (1966).
to 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964) (initial report must be filed at time of security's registration
or within ten days of becoming beneficial owner, director or officer, and subsequent reports
must be filed within ten days after the close of any calendar month in which a change in
ownership occurs). See genwrallt 2 L. Loss. SECURITIES REGULATION 1037-58 (2d ed. 1961).
"See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp.. 136 F.2d 231, 235-36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
751 (1943).
".See Adler v. Klawans. 267 F.2d 840. 844-45 (2d Cir. 1959).
1- 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
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purpose, however, the courts have encountered certain problem
areas in which it has been impossible to ignore completely the
insider's subjective intent 14 One such area is where the insider is a
partner in a broker-dealer firm, and the partnership engages in
short-swing transactions. s In Blau v. Lehman6 the Supreme Court
noted that a broker-dealer partnership would be considered a
"director" within the meaning of section 16(b) if it were
represented on an issuer's board of directors by a "deputy." 7 In
Blau the plaintiff argued that defendant Lehman Brothers was
required to disgorge short-swing profits made on transactions in
stock of the Tidewater Oil Company, since a Lehman Brothers
partner was on the Tidewater board of directors.'9 The Supreme
Court affirmed the lower court findings 9 that the partner was not
on the Tidewater board in order to represent Lehman Brothers'
interests and that no inside information was used by Lehman
Brothers. 0 Noting that the question of deputization is one of fact
"See Munter, Section 16(b) oJ the Securities Ecchange Act oJ 1934: An Alternative to
-'Burning Down the Barn in Order to Kill the Rats." 52 CORNELL L.Q. 69 (1966); Painter,
The Evolving Role oJ Section 16tbh) 62 Midt. L. Rev. 649 (1964).
13 It is generally stated that section 16(b) does not reach 'tippee" cases. 2 L. Loss.
SECURITIES REGULATION 1043 (2d ed. 1961). Although early drafts of section 16(b) prohibited
insiders from disclosing inside information to outsiders and made the profits of the "tippce"
recoverable by the issuer, these provisions were never enacted because of anticipated
difficulties of proof. Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Comnm.
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 133 (1934).
"368 U.S. 403 (1962).
' Id. at 409-10. See also Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564. 567 (2d Cir. 1952) (concurring
opinion).
"368 U.S. at 404-05.
"Blau v. Lehman, 173 F. Supp. 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aJj'd, 286 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1960).
It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court found actual use of inside information
relevant, especially since Mr. Justice Black indicated that 16(b) would not reach the "tippee"
cases. 368 U.S. at 411-13. Apparently, however, once the question of "deputization" is
decided in the affirmative, intent or actual use of inside information would become
irrelevant. See Munter, supra note 14, at 80 n.53.
It has been noted that there is a statutory route which would justify the Supreme Court's
conclusion that a partnership or corporation may be a 16(b) director. Section 16(b) refers to
"any director." Section 3(a)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(7) (1964), defines a "director" to include
any person performing functions of a director. Section 3(a)(9) of the Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78(c)(9) (1964), defines a "'person" to include a partnership or corporation.
The applicability of Blau to broker-dealers has been somewhat limited by the 1964
amendments concerning trading for purposes of market making and stabilization. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(d), added by 15 U.S.C. § 78p(d) (1964); Painter, Section
16(d) of the Securities Exchange Act; Legislative Compromise or Loophole?, 113 U. PA. L.
REv. 358 (1965).
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to be determined in each case, the Court reasoned that Congress
could amend section 16(b) if it disapproved of the subjective inquiry
incidental to applying the deputization theory 1 Another area in
which the functional purpose of section 16(b) appears to have
pevailed over a literal interpretation has been where the courts have
found a director liable for short-swing profits realized on stock
purchased before his directorship but sold while he was a director
within six months of purchase.2 In supporting such a decision in
Alder v. Klawans2 3 the Second Circuit relied heavily on the
provision in section 16(b) that short-swing profit liability shall not
be imposed on a "beneficial owner" where he was not such at both
the time of sale and purchase.24 This explicit provision was thought
to give rise to the implication that a director or officer would be
liable under section 16(b) despite the fact that he did not have such
insider status at both the time of purchase and sale? The court
further noted that section 16(b) is remedial, not penal, and thus a
broad interpretation most nearly accords with the legislative
purpose 6
In Feder, after reviewing the district court's finding that Bunker
was not a deputy of Martin Marietta on Sperry Rand's board of
directors, the court of appeals stated that it would reverse only if
the inferences drawn from the evidence were "clearly erronous"
since the question of deputization was one of fact. Noting the
district court's reliance on the fact that Bunker's services were
solicited by Sperry Rand for his professional expertise, the court
indicated that, though not determinative, more weight should have
been accorded to the fact that Bunker was chief executive of
Martin Marietta and had the ultimate control of investment
decisions.27 The court distinguished Blau v. Lehman on the grounds
2- 368 U.S. at 412-13 (noting that congressional amendments could have disavowed the
deputization theory when it was first articulated in Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564 (2d
Cir. 1952)).
!See Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959); Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v.
Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y.
1958).
2 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959).
21 Id. at 845. Despite this provision the Second Circuit in Stella v. Graham-Paige Motor
Corp., 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956). held a beneficial owner can
be liable under 16(b) where the purchase in issue was the one that made him a 10.f owner.
3 267 F.2d at 845.
I d. at 844. See Munter, supra note 14.
406 F.2d at 264.
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that in that case the partner, who was found not to have imparted
inside information to the broker-dealer firm, "exercised no power
of approval concerning the partnership's investment . . . ." In
view of Bunker's control of Martin Marietta's investments, the
court found insignificant "the district court's finding that Bunker
'never disclosed information relevant to investment decisions' and
that the 'information he obtained while a director simply wasn't
germane to that question at all.' "2 Moreover, the court found
relevant Bunker's letter of resignation, which stated that he had
only agreed to be a director because of Martin Marietta's large
investment in Sperry Rand, and the fact that Martin Marietta's
board of directors did not approve Bunker's directorship of Sperry
until after Martin Marietta had substantial investments in Sperry
stock 0 In view of the compelling inferences from the evidence, the
court held that the district court had committed a mistake in
finding no deputization.31
An additional and perhaps more difficult issue which had to be
resolved in order to find 16(b) liability was presented by the fact
that Martin Marietta had not sold the Sperry Rand stock until
after Bunker had resigned his directorship. The defendant relied on
rule 16a-10 of the Securities Exchange Commission'" which
releases from 16(b) liability any "transaction" exempted from the
section 16(a) reporting requirement. Accordingly, since 16(a) would
not apply after a director resigned,3 3 the defendants contended that
16(b) would not apply. Moreover, the defendants argued that in
imposing short-swing profit liability on "such beneficial owner,
director, or officer," 16(b) is thereby referring to the same type of
individual who is subjected to the reporting requirements of 16(a),
namely an individual "who is . .. (a] beneficial owner . .. a
director or an officer. . . ...3 Thus, the defendants contended that
the use of the present tense in the 16(a) description made 16(b)
literally inapplicable where the transaction occurs after a director
Id. at 265.
Id. at 264.
I d. at 265-66.
"Id. at 266.
17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-10 (1968).
-See 2 L. Loss. SECURITIES REGtLA0o 1061 (2d ed. 1961).
15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964) (emphasis added) (quoted in part in text accompanying note
10 supra).
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has resigned 5 The court rejected these contentions, however, and
held rule 16a-10 invalid to the extent that it would exempt the
Feder transaction.36 Though noting the plausibility of the
defendant's argument upon a literal reading of 16(a) and 16(b), the
court directed attention to the Security and Exchange
Commission's Form 4,37 which seemed to extend reporting
requirements to ex-directors so as to include any transactions
occurring in their last month as a director.*" Since Form 4
apparently extended 16(a) coverage, the court reasoned that it must
likewise expand potential liability under 16(b). ' However, although
the Form 4 ex-director provision was a valid exercise of the
Commission's rule-making power, the court reasoned that the effect
of the extension on 16(b) was arbitrary in that 16(b) liability could
thus depend upon how early in the month a director resigned. Thus,
the court concluded, given the SEC's ability to extend the reporting
requirements of ex-directors, a less arbitrary extension of 16(b)
coverage would seem only logical.4u The court further noted that
where stock is purchased during the period of insider status and
disposed of shortly after the termination of that status, there exists
a greater likelihood that both the purchase and sale are motivated
by inside information than in the Adler-type situation where only
the sale could be motivated by inside information!' Upon this basis
the court held "that § 16(b) applies to a sale of corporate stock by
a former director of that corporation if the stock were purchased
by him (or purchased by any jural person that had 'deputized' him)
during the time he was a director and the sale was made within six
months after purchase. '" -
After Feder the scope of the deputization theory remains
unclear. It seems apparent that a deputizing corporation or
partnership must file section 16(a) reports. The Feder court's
focusing on the unique prophylactic aspects of section 16,
moreover, indicates that a deputizing corporation or partnership,
31406 F.2d at 267.
Id. at 268.
:r Form 4 is authorized by 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-I(a) (1968).
406 F.2d at 268.
'Id.
I Id. at 269.
"Id. at 268.
'. Id. at 269.
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which is considered a director for section 16 purposes, might not be
considered a director for other purposes such as liability for signing
a registration statement. The question less clearly answered by
Feder, however, is whether a partnership or corporation must have
a direct financial investment in the issuer before the partnership or
corporation employee, who is a director of the issuer, will be
considered to be a deputy. In Feder the deputizing firm had a large
equity investment in Sperry Rand. Presumably the court would
have found sufficient representation of an "interest" for
deputization purposes even if Martin Marietta had initially been
attempting to protect an investment of debt securities in Sperry
Rand. If the facts had been different and Martin Marietta had put
Bunker on Sperry Rand's board merely with the intent of
protecting future investments, then deputization to protect an
investment interest could not be found until just after the first
purchase of Sperry Rand securities.!3 Of course, a court could find
deputization without direct financial investment, but this would be
tantamount to repudiating the idea that section 16 does not reach
the "tippee" case.Y Very likely, however, the courts will begin to
find deputization under section 16 when the recipient of the
insider's tip is the partner or employer of the actual insider,
regardless of the nature of the deputizing firm's initial "interest" in
the issuer. Furthermore, it would seem that as a practical matter
the deputizing corporation usually will be unable to place a deputy
on the issuer's board until it has substantial, direct financial
investments in the issuer.
In addition to applying the deputization theory, the Feder court
so extended 16(b) liability that the decision well may portend the
day when one-time insiders will be held accountable for short-swing
profits reaped up to a year after the termination of their insider
status. The Second Circuit's movement in this direction seems
more the result of the court's distaste for insider deals, however,
than the product of a careful analysis of the Act's express
language. For example, in Feder the court operated on the
seemingly questionable assumption that the Securities and
Exchange Commission's Form 4 "governs the reporting provision
Cf. note 24 supra.
"See notes 15 & 20 supra.
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of § 16(a) .... -4 The court noted that Form 4 requires reports
by
[e]very person who at any time during any calendar month was
* . . a director or officer of. . .the issuer ...and who during
such month had any change in his beneficial ownership of any class
of equity securities of such company...
Contrary to the court's assumption that Form 4 represents a
"proper exercise" of the Commission's rule-making power,47 one
might be led to the conclusion that it is overly broad. Arguably, the
best reading of 16(a) is that it requires a report by any person who
was a director during any calendar month only if the ownership
change took place during the existence of insider status! 8 However,
probably in order to expand section 16's impact beyond the
narrow, and admittedly equivocal, statutory limits, the court chose
to read Form 4 as requiring reporting of all changes during any
calendar month in which insider status existed. Once having used
Form 4 expansively to interpret section 16(a), however, the court
immediately stated that Form 4 was itself "arbitrarily
inadequate." 9 This conclusion was readily acceptable since the
impact of section 16 would be avoided by resigning at the end of
one calendar month and reaping short-swing profit in the next.
Thus, without establishing outside limits, the Second Circuit has
held that section 16(b) "putative liability" extends at least as far as
the Form 4 reporting requirements, and that Form 4 does not
impose sufficiently extensive requirementsY0
Future cases will determine whether the Second Circuit is
actually moving to proscribe transactions taking place up to a year
after the termination of insider status. For example, cases will
undoubtedly arise in which (1) the director purchases (or sells) prior
to assuming his directorship and sells (or purchases) after his
resignation, all within six months; (2) an ex-director both purchases
and sells within six months after his resignation; or (3) an ex-director
u' 406 F.2d at 268.
"Id. at 267.
Id. at 268.
"ASee 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964). Form 4 interprets 16(a) to require reporting of anty
change in ownership which occurs during a calendar month in which the individual was at
any time a director.
"1406 F.2d at 269.
10 Id.
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purchases (or sells) within six months of resignation and thereafter
reaps short-swing profit. These cases are distinguishable from Adler
and Feder which both involved at least one transaction that occurred
during the directorship. However, the underlying rationale of both
Adler and Feder might lead to a finding of director liability in the
first suggested case since the transaction subsequent to termination
could have been motivated by inside information. Therefore,
liability might also be found in the second suggested case since it is
entirely possible for a director to have meaningful inside
information six months after resignation. Moreover, such reasoning
would undoubtedly bring about liability in the third suggested case.
The Feder court ignored the possibility of such extensions but it
also did not suggest that it intended to limit liability to situations
in which at least one of the transactions takes place within the
insider period. Though the latter approach would be in accord with
the mechanical nature of 16(b), it would not necessarily effectuate
what the Second Circuit feels to be the underlying purpose of the
Act. This can be shown by contrasting two possible short-swing
situations. Consider first the director in corporation A who resigns
and within the following calendar month purchases and sells large
amounts of A stock. Certainly these transactions could have been,
and most likely were, motivated by inside information obtained by
the ex-director while he was a director. However, under the
"'mechanical" interpretation, 16(b) would not apply since neither
transaction occurred during the insider period. Contrasted to this
situation is the one where a director in corporation A purchases A
stock the day before he resigns and sells five and one-half months
later. In this case 16(b) would apply though it is less probable that
inside information was used in this case than in the former
situation. The Second Circuit's opinion in Feder has set the basis
for expansion of 16(b). It seems that the court prefers to use a
broad interpretation of section 16, which imposes "mechanical"
strict liability, rather than using a literal interpretation and relying
upon those other securities regulation provisions5l which necessitate
a true ascertainment of whether inside information has been
misused.
':/ bg., Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2). 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1964); Securities Act of
1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964); Rule lOb-5 or the Securities Exchange
Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).
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